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The influence of emotion on higher-order cognitive functions, such as attention allocation,
planning, and decision-making, is a growing area of research with important clinical
applications. In this review, we provide a computational framework to conceptualize
emotional influences on inhibitory control, an important building block of executive
functioning. We first summarize current neuro-cognitive models of inhibitory control and
show how Bayesian ideal observer models can help reframe inhibitory control as a
dynamic decision-making process. Finally, we propose a Bayesian framework to study
emotional influences on inhibitory control, providing several hypotheses that may be
useful to conceptualize inhibitory control biases in mental illness such as depression and
anxiety. To do so, we consider the neurocognitive literature pertaining to how affective
states can bias inhibitory control, with particular attention to how valence and arousal
may independently impact inhibitory control by biasing probabilistic representations of
information (i.e., beliefs) and valuation processes (e.g., speed-error tradeoffs).
Keywords: emotion, inhibitory control, Bayesian modeling, ideal observer model
INTRODUCTION
How do feeling and thinking influence one another? From our
subjective experience, and systematic behavioral research, we
know that affective states profoundly influence cognitive func-
tions, in both facilitative and antagonistic manners depending
on the context. This relationship between affect and behavior
is not surprising, given the extensive interactions between the
physiological and interoceptive manifestation of emotion (Craig,
2002; Paulus and Stein, 2006) and cognitive control networks
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Pessoa, 2009). In particular, impairments
in critical executive faculties such as inhibitory control (Miyake
et al., 2000) are tightly linked to clinical disorders involving
pervasive emotional states and difficulty in regulating emotion.
However, little is known about the specific computational and
cognitive processes underlying such interactions between emo-
tion and inhibition. Thus, understanding precisely how emotion
is integrated into core executive functions, such as inhibitory con-
trol, is essential not only for cognitive neuroscience, but also for
refining neurocognitive models of psychopathology.
In this review, we propose a computational framework to
conceptualize emotional influences on cognition, focusing in par-
ticular on inhibitory control. We build upon research suggesting
that a wide range of apparently distinct cognitive faculties can be
unified under a common “ideal observer” framework of decision-
making and dynamic choice. Rational observer models have been
applied widely to the study of choice in uncertain environments,
and to identify potential neural markers of the iterative pro-
cesses of belief update underlying such models (Hampton et al.,
2006; Behrens et al., 2007). Subsequent modeling work showed
that such a framework is readily adapted to various aspects of
executive function, including attentional and inhibitory control
(Yu and Dayan, 2005; Yu et al., 2009; Shenoy and Yu, 2011; Ide
et al., 2013). In particular, this literature suggests that appar-
ently distinct faculties in inhibitory control can be folded into
a single framework where subtle differences in task contexts are
reflected in their influence on components of the framework,
giving rise to the diversity of observed behavior. Building on
this research, we argue for an emotion-aware rational observer
model of inhibitory control, where emotions serve as addi-
tional context for the computations underlying behavior. Indeed,
previous research has explored the idea of emotion providing
information about one’s internal state to the executive system.
Therefore, emotion can be considered part of the information
that along with external stimuli is integrated to perform con-
trolled actions (Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Forgas, 2002). Such
biases appear to bemediated bymood-congruent effects onmem-
ory [i.e., priming access to and retrieval of mood-congruent
concepts and outcomes (Bower, 1981)] and interoceptive pro-
cesses [i.e., conveying information about ones’ valuation of /
disposition toward choice options (Schwarz and Clore, 1983)].
Therefore, here we propose a wider role for emotional context
in cognition, and consider how it may affect beliefs and action
valuation in much the same way as other environmental con-
straints and information do.We consider such interactions within
the confines of our decision-making framework for inhibitory
control, thereby allowing us to relating emotion directly to
other, well-understood computational principles underlying
cognition.
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In the following sections, we first review Bayesian ideal
observer models of inhibitory control using a shared compu-
tational framework to guide discussion. The following section
is organized into two parts, distinguishing two broad types of
computational elements that may be modulated by emotion,
namely a) probabilistic computations (i.e., reflecting individu-
als’ beliefs about the frequency of certain events or actions)
and b) valuation computations (i.e., reflecting the value or cost
associated with potential outcomes and actions). To maximize
the theoretical usefulness of our model, we further opt for a
dimensional decomposition of emotion rather than considering
the impact of multiple separate emotions on inhibitory control.
Thus, within this computational framework, we distinguish two
empirically validated dimensions of emotion with distinct physi-
ological markers (Lang et al., 1997; Tellegen et al., 1999; Davidson,
2003): valence or motivational tendency (i.e., positive/appetitive
vs. negative/aversive tone), and arousal (or emotional salience or
intensity). We acknowledge that while valence and motivational
tendency are theoretically different constructs and their respec-
tive validity still a matter of debate, they have a high degree of
overlap in most emotional states. Specifically, most negative emo-
tions are withdrawal based and positive emotions are approach
based, with one notable exception being anger (Harmon-Jones
and Allen, 1998). Given the limited number of studies specif-
ically attempting to dissociate the effects of these dimensions
on inhibitory control, it was not feasible to distinguish between
them in the present review. However, we address this distinc-
tion in our proposed framework by considering two mediating
computational mechanisms through which valence and arousal
may infuse the computational underpinnings of inhibitory con-
trol, namely outcome vs. action related computational processes.
In support of this distinction, separate neural markers have been
linked to anticipation of an outcome vs. the appetitive or aversive
disposition or drive toward a particular outcome [i.e., action ten-
dency; (Breiter et al., 2001; Miller and Tomarken, 2001; Knutson
and Peterson, 2005; Boksem et al., 2008)]. Thus, from a com-
putational and neural perspective, these outcome and action
tendencies may emerge from very different underlying compo-
nents. Therefore, we evaluate valence and arousal with respect to
their potential impact on (a) action and outcome expectancies
(i.e., probabilistic predictions), as well as (b) action and outcome
valuation (i.e., relative importance of these events in the decision
policy).
We propose several hypotheses linking these affective dimen-
sions (and their attendant behavioral influences) to specific
components of the computational framework. Based on the
AIM model of affect infusion and extensive literature pointing
to a strong interdependence between hedonic valence and the
behavioral activation/inhibition system (Niv et al., 2007; Huys
et al., 2011; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012), we conjecture that the
valence dimension may promote both valence-congruent effects
on outcome-related computations and motivational effects on
activation and inhibition. In contrast, arousal may primarily
modulate action cancellation expectancies and, at higher thresh-
olds, have a more indirect impact on computational processes by
redirecting attentional resources and impairing prefrontal corti-
cal function (Arnsten, 2009a). These hypotheses suggest testable,
quantitative relationships between emotional state and inhibitory
control.
MODELS OF INHIBITORY CONTROL
COGNITIVE MODELS OF INHIBITORY CONTROL
Much of the theoretical literature on inhibitory control focuses
on the contrast between action and inhibition and different
aspects of inhibition such as attentional and behavioral inhi-
bition. Accordingly, the literature suggests separate functional
instantiation of these putative processes, both in abstract cog-
nitive models and in proposals for neural architectures. For
instance, several articles propose a conflict model of inhibitory
control, where certain stimuli may activate multiple action plans,
thus generating conflict between competing responses (Botvinick
et al., 2001). This notion of conflict has been explored at the
neural level using a contrast between trial types in a variety of
tasks such as the Stroop task (Barch et al., 2000; Macleod and
Macdonald, 2000), the flanker task (Botvinick et al., 1999) the
Simon task (Peterson et al., 2002; Kerns, 2006), and the Stop
Signal task (Brown and Braver, 2005). As an example, in the
Eriksen task, incongruent stimuli are thought to generate con-
flict between the responses associated with central and flanker
stimuli, resulting in behavioral differences and corresponding
neural activation. Other work has drawn on the empirical data
to suggest architectures for monitoring and resolution of con-
flict (Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, 2007) and error (Brown
and Braver, 2005), where specific areas of the brain monitor any
resulting conflicts or errors in order to adjust behavior appro-
priately. Closely related work considers models of the specific
underlying processes that may give rise to action and inhibition,
respectively. For instance, in the stop signal task, the influen-
tial race model of stopping (Logan and Cowan, 1984) suggests
that behavior is an outcome of a race between finishing times
of “stop” and “go” processes, corresponding to inhibition and
response, respectively. A rich literature has explored potential
instantiations of this race model at various levels of neural activ-
ity: from neural firing rates (Hanes et al., 1998; Paré and Hanes,
2003; Stuphorn et al., 2010) to population activity in specific
brain regions such as the IFC (Aron et al., 2004) to putative
“stopping circuitry” involved in inhibition of action (Aron et al.,
2007a).
The consensus in much of this work is of a contrast between
inhibition and action, with potentially different mechanisms and
neural circuitry involved in these functions. Further, individuals
are thought to exercise different kinds of inhibition, depending on
the task demands. From this perspective, behavioral and neural
measures of performance in inhibitory control tasks measure the
relative efficacy or dysfunction of these competing systems, and
each such measure may reflect the performance of a different sub-
system. For instance, (Eagle et al., 2008) compare and contrast
the go/nogo and stop signal tasks from behavioral, neural and
pharmacological perspectives, suggesting a dissociation between
different kinds of behavioral inhibition: “restraint” (the go/nogo
task) and “cancellation” (the stop signal task). Other work (Nee
et al., 2007; Swick et al., 2011) explores, from a neural perspective,
the possibility of shared circuitry in various inhibitory control
tasks.
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In contrast, recent work explores the possibility of studying
inhibition using rational observer models, where all behavioral
outcomes (various responses, or the absence of a response) are
produced by a single, rational (i.e., reward-maximizing) decision-
making framework. In the rest of this section, we outline the
proposed framework using different inhibitory control tasks as
examples. The framework promises to unify the wide variety of
behavioral and neural results from studies of different inhibitory
control tasks, currently ascribed to different functional systems.
In addition, this unifying perspective may suggest how other,
apparently distinct, influences such as emotion, may also be
integrated into a computational decision-making perspective.
INHIBITORY CONTROL AS RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
A recent body of work (Yu et al., 2009; Shenoy and Yu, 2011,
2012; Shenoy et al., 2012) recast behavior in a wide variety
of inhibitory control tasks as rational (i.e., reward-maximizing)
tradeoffs between uncertainty and the cost of available actions.
This cost-benefit tradeoff is an ongoing decision-making process
that unfolds over time as noisy sensory inputs are processed, and
reconciled with prior expectations about possible outcomes. A
general outline of the decision-making framework is shown in
Figure 1. The figure shows an example where certain events in
the real world that are task-relevant (e1, . . . , e3, top panel) are
processed gradually over time and represented as beliefs or prob-
abilities (middle panel). In the example, e1 and e2 are mutually
exclusive events (for instance, a forced-choice stimulus), whereas
e3 may or may not occur at some subsequent time. Note that
this simple representation captures the general dynamics of most
of the discussed inhibitory control tasks. The beliefs (bt) shown
in the figure represent the evolving degree of uncertainty an
FIGURE 1 | Rational decision-making in inhibitory control. The
figure abstracts out ideas common across recent decision-making
models for inhibitory control into a single framework. Left: an
example where task-relevant events e1 and e2 are mutually exclusive
(e.g., a forced choice stimulus), and e3 occurs at some later point in
time. Sensory evidence from these events are gradually reconciled
with prior expectations to form a noisy, evolving belief, or subjective
probability, about whether the event occurred. These beliefs form the
basis of an ongoing valuation of, and selection between, available
actions. Right: A representation of this sequential decision-making
process. At each time point, noisy sensory inputs (xi ) are incorporated
into beliefs (bi ), which are transformed into a choice between actions
(a1,. . . an, wait) based on the decision policy (
∏
).
individual has about the state of the world—e.g., has e3 occurred
already? Such beliefs are, naturally, influenced by prior expecta-
tions. For example, the initial anticipation that e3 might occur
is tempered by the initial lack of sensory evidence, whereas sub-
sequent occurrence of the event is quickly reflected in the belief.
Based on the belief state, subjects have to weigh the costs associ-
ated with various available actions, and select repeatedly between
them. Note that in themodel, inaction is also an available “action,”
with an attendant cost determined by the environment, and an
advantage of acquiring more information for decision-making.
The entire decision-making schematic is depicted in the right
panel of Figure 1.
Below, we illustrate how the framework may be applied to a
variety of inhibitory control paradigms. Through this exercise,
we aim to demonstrate that (1) different inhibitory control tasks
may be understood and interpreted using the same shared frame-
work, and (2) the apparent idiosyncrasies of behavior in the tasks
reflect subtle differences in the task contexts, and draw focus on
specific components of the proposed model. The first two sec-
tions address belief formation and updating, which we show can
occur within trial (i.e., based on increased certainty about rele-
vant sensory information) but also on a trial-to-trial basis (i.e.,
based on cumulative experience with the task). The third section
introduces valuation processes as a framework for understanding
speed accuracy tradeoffs.
Sensory disambiguation: conflict and resolution
We illustrate the influence of sensory processing models on
decision making and inhibitory control using the example of
interference paradigms introduced above. These tasks all share a
critical similarity in that each one sets up a mismatch between
two different features of a perceptual stimulus—i.e., information
contained in the features may be congruent or incongruent with
each other. The tasks, however, require a response based only
on a single stimulus feature. In each of the tasks, subjects are
more error-prone and slower to respond on incongruent trials.
This difference has been attributed to various aspects of cog-
nitive processing such as attentional or cognitive inhibition in
terms of suppressing irrelevant information (Stroop & Eriksen
tasks), or response conflict (Simon task). Instead, behavior in
each of these tasks can be reinterpreted as a process of within-
trial sensory disambiguation and belief update. In particular,
(Yu et al., 2009) proposed that human sensory processing may
have a “compatibility bias,” where visual features are assumed to
vary smoothly over space. This bias could potentially be acquired
through experiential or evolutionary means. For instance, in the
Eriksen task, this assumption may manifest itself via mixing of
sensory evidence between central (C) and flanker (F) stimuli, as
illustrated in Figure 2A (adapted and simplified from Yu et al.,
2009). The figure suggests that, although the relevant sensory
evidence (xt) should only depend on the central stimulus (solid
line), perceptual processing is nevertheless affected by flanker
stimuli (yt). As a consequence, decoding the central stimulus
identity necessitates also decoding the trial type T (congruent
or incongruent). Thus, in the proposed framework, the sensory
processing that unfolds over time is tasked with disambiguating
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FIGURE 2 | Sensory disambiguation in the Eriksen task (Yu et al.,
2009). (A) The model assumes that sensory inputs xt (central stimulus) yt
(flanker) are mixed. Responding to the central stimulus C necessitates
processing all sensory information and simultaneously decoding both the
central stimulus and trial type T (T = c on congruent trials; T = i on
incongruent trials) which depends on disambiguation of central and flanker
(F) stimuli; H,S = stimulus type. (B) The corresponding Bayesian inference
process (schematic) quickly discovers that the trial has an incongruent
stimulus, but decoding the central stimulus identity may take longer due to
featural mixing and potentially higher prior expectations of encountering
congruent trials (i.e., β > 0.5).
the trial type and stimulus identity in a joint belief state as
follows:
P{C,T|Xt,Yt} ∝ p(xt |C)p(yt |C,T)P{C,T|Xt − 1,Yt − 1} (1)
Here, the central stimulus identity (C = “H” or “S”) and the
trial type T (T = c for congruent or T = i for incongruent)
are both discrete and binary valued. The joint distribution in
Equation 1 incorporates all the information gathered from pre-
vious observations (xt , yt). This iterative process is initialized by
a prior distribution representing prior beliefs about the preva-
lence of congruent trials [β = P(T = c|X0,Y0)] and the possible
central/flankers stimuli configurations (e.g., “SSS” vs. “HHH”
for congruent trials, and “SHS” vs. “HSH” for incongruent tri-
als, based on a simplified case of only 2 flankers, see Figure 2B).
To make a perceptual decision about the central stimulus C,
the total (marginal) probability P(C = H|Xt,Yt) is computed
by summing the joint probabilities over the uncertainty about
congruency (i.e., T = c and T = i):
P (C = H|Xt,Yt) = P (C = H,T = c|Xt,Yt)
+ P (C = H,T = i|Xt,Yt) (2a)
Since the stimulus identity only assumes two values (“H” or
“S”), the probability of C being S is simply:
P (C = S|Xt,Yt) = 1 − P (C = H|Xt,Yt) (2b)
It can be shown that the optimal decision policy compares these
two marginal probabilities against a decision threshold q, and
decides that the target is H if P(C = H|Xt , Yt) > q, or S if P(C =
S|Xt , Yt) > q. If these conditions are not met, the policy contin-
ues observing the input data. On congruent trials, the reinforcing
effect of the irrelevant flanker features lead to fast, more accu-
rate responses, whereas incongruent trials require much longer to
decode due to the corrupting influence of the flankers on stimulus
disambiguation. So, for instance, the “compatibility bias” shown
by subjects may manifest itself through a skewed prior belief in
the probability of compatibility (i.e., β > 0.5; see Figure 2B). As
outlined in part III, we propose that emotional states may influ-
ence sensory processing (hence behavioral performance) via such
altered prior probability distributions.
Belief updating: learning to anticipate
In addition to thewithin trial evolution of beliefs observed during
sensory disambiguation, recent work (Ide et al., 2013) suggests
that prior expectations and belief updating occurring across tri-
als also profoundly influence inhibitory control. For example, in
a stop signal task, they showed that the immediate experienced
history of trial types induced an ever-changing expectation of a
stop signal on the upcoming trial, P(stop), and that the prior
probability successfully predicted subsequent response times and
accuracy on the trials. Formally, if rk is the stop signal frequency
on trial k and sk is the actual trial type (1 on stop trials and 0
on go trials), P(stop) is the mean of the predictive distribution
p(rk|Sk− 1), which is a mixture of the previous posterior distribu-
tion p(rk− 1|Sk− 1), and a fixed prior distribution [p0(r)], with α
and 1 − α acting as the mixing coefficients, respectively:
p(rk|Sk− 1) = αp(rk− 1|Sk− 1) + (1 − α)p0(rk) (3a)
where Sk = {s1, . . . , sk}
with the posterior distribution being updated according to Bayes’
Rule:
p(rk|Sk) ∝ P(sk− 1|rk)p(rk|Sk− 1) (3b)
Note that the probabilities in Equations 3a,b, as those in
Equations 1 [β = P(C,T|X0, Y0)], represent expectancies about
the likelihood of encountering various trial types associated with
specific action requirements (e.g., frequency of stop trials, con-
gruent trials, etc.), before the onset of each trial. Equations 3a,b
show that these expectancies may evolve across trials to form
an iterative prior probability for the associated action. As we
discuss subsequently, while such action expectancies are key com-
putational mediators of inhibitory performance, expectations of
reward or punishment (i.e., outcome expectancies) may be equally
relevant to our framework as they tend to co-vary with emotional
sates. For instance, the use of inherently rewarding or punish-
ing stimuli as trial type cues (i.e., paired with go or stop action
requirement) may provide additional context to bias estimations
of trial type probabilities (e.g., which could be modeled by an
additional fixed prior that influences stimulus expectation).
Speed-accuracy tradeoffs: go bias and rational impatience
Focusing on inhibition and action valuation, we now introduce a
general cost function framework for perceptual decision-making
tasks as an example of how action valuation impacts measures of
inhibition. Subsequently, we focus on two variants of this percep-
tual decision-making framework, namely the 2-alternative forced
choice (2AFC) task (e.g., flanker) and the go/no-go task. As indi-
cated in Figure 1, the moment-by-moment belief state generated
through sensory processing results in estimation of inferred costs
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of these actions and an appropriate choice. Note that choosing
to postpone responding for one more time step is also an avail-
able action, and has a specific cost associated with it: the cost of
opportunity. An action selection policy therefore needs to min-
imize the overall, or expected, cost of action choice inclusive
of decision delay costs. These competing goals are made con-
crete in the form of a cost function that specifies the objective
to be minimized through the action selection policy. In percep-
tual decision-making, as an example, a well-studied cost function
minimizes a linear sum of response time and accuracy:
Cost = c ∗ RT + ce ∗ P (choice error) + P
(
no response
)
(4a)
The terms in this equation represent the cost of time
(parameter c), the cost of choosing the wrong response (ce), and
the cost of exceeding the response deadline (which, for simplicity,
is normalized to unit cost). P(choice error) and P(no response)
are time varying probabilities of making a choice error (due to
stimulus misidentification) and making no response, respectively.
This sets up a natural speed-accuracy tradeoff where the costs
of the two available responses depend on the uncertainty of the
stimulus identity, and the cost of waiting one more time step
may be offset by the possibility of gaining more information. The
parameter ce includes the intrinsic cost associated with error, but
may also include extrinsic reward (e.g., the monetary gain/loss
received based on the outcome of each trial). Referring back to
Figure 1, this cost function forms the basis of estimating action
costs based on the current belief state (bt). More specifically, let τ
denote the trial termination time, D the response deadline, and d
the true stimulus state (e.g., d = 0, 1). Then, an action policy π
maps each belief state (bt) to a choice of actions (i.e., wait, choose
A, or choose B), and over the course of repeated action choices
within a trial, results in a termination time τ, and an action choice
δ = 0, 1. The loss associated with τ and δ is then:
l(τ, δ; d,D) = cτ + ce.1{τ<D,δ = d} + 1{τ=D} (4b)
where 1{·} is the indicator function, evaluating to 1 if the condi-
tions in {·} are met and 0 otherwise. Then, on average, the cost
incurred by policy π is:
Lπ =< l(τ, δ) >= c < τ > + ceP(δ = d) + P(τ = D) (4c)
where P(δ = d) is the probability of wrong response, and
P(τ = D) is the probability of not responding before the dead-
line (omission error). The optimal policy is that policy π which
minimizes the average loss, Lπ. The modeling work in this
domain shows that such an optimal decision policy closely mir-
rors human and animal behavior in these tasks, in particular,
correctly predicting changes in behavior when task constraints are
manipulated.
One variant of this forced-choice perceptual decision-making
task is the 2-alternative forced choice task (2AFC; e.g., Flanker
paradigms), in which two stimuli are associated with distinct “go”
responses. Another variant is the go/nogo task, where associating
one stimulus with an overt response, and the other stimulus with
no response during the response window, fundamentally repre-
sents a similar perceptual decision process. While on the surface
the go/nogo task is very similar to forced-choice decision-making,
behavioral and neural evidence suggests an apparent bias toward
the go response that manifests as a propensity toward high false
alarm rates. Such “impatience” has principally been ascribed to
failures of putative inhibitory mechanisms (Aron et al., 2007b;
Eagle et al., 2008). In contrast, (Shenoy and Yu, 2012) suggest
that this behavior may in fact be a rational adaptation of the
speed-accuracy tradeoff for this task. To see why this may be
the case, consider the schematic representation of the decision-
making process in Figure 3. For the 2AFC task, both stimuli
eventually lead to a terminating “go” action (one of the two avail-
able responses). However, for the go/nogo task, one stimulus leads
to a “go” response (and hence termination of the trial), whereas
the other stimulus requires waiting until the end of the trial to
register a “nogo” response. This asymmetry is reflected in the cost
function for the go/nogo task (Shenoy and Yu, 2012):
Cost = c ∗ RT + ce ∗ P
(
false alarm
)+ P (miss) (5a)
where c is the cost of time, ce is the cost of commission error,
P(false alarm) and P(miss) are the probabilities of making com-
mission and miss errors, respectively.
If again τ denotes the trial termination time and D is the trial
deadline, τ = D if no “go” response is made before the deadline,
and τ < D if a response is made. On each trial, the optimum
decision policyπ has to minimize the following expected loss, Lπ:
Lπ = c < τ > + ceP(τ < D|d = 0)P(d = 0)
+ P(τ = D|d = 1)P(d = 1) (5b)
FIGURE 3 | Rational impatience in the go/nogo task (Shenoy and Yu,
2012). (A) The rational decision-making framework suggests that choices
unfold over time as sensory uncertainty is resolved. For a forced -choice
decision-making task, all stimuli eventually result in responses that
terminate the trial. For a go/nogo task, the go stimulus requires a go
response that terminates the trial; however, the nogo stimulus requires
withholding response until the end of the trial; where (xi ) and (yi ) are the
sensory inputs incorporated into beliefs (bi ), and
∏
is the decision policy
relating specific beliefs to a choice between actions (a1, . . . , an, wait). (B)
The asymmetry is reflected in the decision thresholds for the two tasks:
go-nogo response threshold (dashed red line) is initially lower than
forced-choice threshold (solid red line), reflecting the tradeoff between go
errors and opportunity cost (see text).
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where P(d = 0) = P(NoGo) and P(d = 1) = P(Go) are the prob-
abilities that the current trial is NoGo or Go, respectively, P(τ <
D|d = 0) is the probability that a NoGo trial is terminated by
a Go response (false alarm), and P(τ = D|d = 1) is the proba-
bility that no response is emitted before D on a Go trial (miss).
Here, P(Go) and P(NoGo) reflect prior beliefs about the current
trial type being a Go or a NoGo trial respectively (i.e., action
expectancies), whereas P(τ < D|d = 0) and P(τ = D|d = 1) are
the overall fraction of false alarm or miss error respectively. Note
that a correct NoGo response consists of a series of “wait” actions
until the response deadline D is reached.
Compare this with the previous cost function (Equations
4a–c), for perceptual decision-making. In both tasks, the deci-
sion to “go”/terminate the trial (i.e., τ < D) limits the costs
associated with response delay, and the choice to “wait” (i.e.,
τ = D) decreases error related costs since it results in additional
data observation and therefore helps the disambiguation process.
Bellman’s dynamic programming principle (Bellman, 1952) can
be used to determine the optimum decision policy (i.e., smallest
expected costs of go vs. wait actions), which is computed itera-
tively as a function of the belief state bt , i.e., Q-factors Qw(bt) and
Qg(bt) for wait and go actions, respectively. That is, if Qw(bt) <
Qg(bt), the optimal policy chooses to wait, otherwise it chooses
to go (adapted from Shenoy and Yu, 2011, 2012).
In the go/nogo task, however, the cost function directly trades
off response times against the go bias, since shorter RT leads
to lower overall cost of time, and a lower miss rate, at the cost
of an increase in false alarm rate. This is reflected in the deci-
sion boundaries corresponding to the forced choice and go/nogo
tasks (Figure 3B). In the forced-choice task, whenever the belief
in stimulus identity crosses one of two symmetric thresholds, a
response is generated. This threshold decreases as the response
deadline approaches, since beliefs are unlikely to change drasti-
cally in the remaining time. In contrast, the go/nogo threshold is
an initially increasing single threshold, capturing the notion that
early on in the trial, an erroneous go response may be preferable
to the prospect of waiting until the end of the trial.
INHIBITORY CAPACITY, TASK CONTEXT, AND EMOTION
Here, we examined a rational decision-making framework for
inhibitory control, where various behavioral effects (and asso-
ciated measures of inhibitory capacity or failure) were seen as
emergent properties of an evolving cost-benefit tradeoff. This
view captures behavior in a range of tasks such as the Stroop
task, the Eriksen task, the go/nogo task, and the stop signal
task, each of which is used to study a putatively different aspect
of inhibitory control. Specifically, we described two classes of
parameters that capture the dynamic decision-making process
supporting inhibitory control, namely those representing (1)
individuals’ beliefs about task-related events and (2) the relative
values associated with these events. In terms of belief estimation,
we consider action expectancies (e.g., probability of encounter-
ing a stop or go trial), as well as outcome expectancies (e.g.,
probability of making an error, of encountering an appetitive
stimulus). Similarly, for valuation processes, our model distin-
guishes action related costs (e.g., time/opportunity or activation
costs) and outcome related costs (e.g., cost of error). Summing
up the implications of this work, we see that the different behav-
ioral measures of inhibitory capacity are all attributable to one
or more specific constituent parameters of the decision-making
framework which subserves performance in all of these tasks.
Thus, seemingly disparate functions such as action, restraint and
cancellation, attentional and behavioral inhibition, can be folded
into a unifying framework of information and valuation, where
the diversity of behavior principally reflect subtle differences in
the task design, and their subsequent influence on components of
the model. This perspective guides our view of the potential roles
of emotion in inhibitory control: By conceptualizing emotion as
additional context available to (or imposed upon) the decision-
maker, we may then generate constrained hypotheses about how
such emotional context may impact behavior within the con-
fines of our proposed decision-making framework. Through this
exercise, we aim to relate emotion directly to other, better-
understood aspects of cognition such as beliefs, valuation, and
choice.
A BAYESIAN FRAMEWORK FOR AFFECT-DRIVEN BIASES IN
INHIBITORY CONTROL
We now examine how the computational framework out-
lined above can be used to understand emotional influ-
ences on inhibitory control. In particular, we hypothesize that
each of the primary emotional dimensions considered (i.e.,
valence/motivational tendency and arousal) may be understood
in terms of their biasing effects on parameters formalizing: (a) the
values and shape of prior probability distributions, and (b) the
relative values of various actions/outcomes. The former focuses
on the generative models that guide the inference of beliefs
from available evidence (i.e., information acquisition and main-
tenance), while the later refers to cost functions that constrain the
action selection policy (i.e., valuation).
In this review, we confine ourselves to computational hypothe-
ses within the decision-making framework—i.e., hypotheses
about how emotion may be viewed as additional context
informing and constraining existing, ongoing computations. We
break down emotional influence into valence/motivational ten-
dency and arousal, two empirically validated dimensions of
emotion, and consider their potential impact on both action
related computations (Figure 4 green areas) and outcome related
computations (Figure 4 blue areas). However, we also consider
possibilities where emotion processing may act as a separate,
competing process diverting attentional and executive resources
away from task-related computations. As we discuss below, this
becomes particularly relevant to the effect of arousal.
PROBABILISTIC COMPUTATION
One way to conceptualize the interaction of emotion and
inhibitory control within a Bayesian framework relates to sensory
disambiguation and belief formation (e.g., expectations about
task relevant stimuli/outcomes). We suggest that the values and
shape of the prior probability distributions associated with given
events are the computational levels where such affective influ-
ences could be implemented. Such probabilistic computations
represent an individual’s prior knowledge of the environment
in which he/she is operating, which is used to make predictions
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FIGURE 4 | Hypothesized biases of emotional dimensions on Bayesian
model parameters. Two categories of parameters are considered: prior
probability distributions [means; P(); top panel] and relative costs [C();
bottom panel], each being further evaluated in terms of primary action
related expectancies (green areas) and task contingent outcomes (light
blue areas). Legend: arrows indicate hypothesized direction of bias, with
bolded arrows indicating stronger or more likely biases (↑, increase/higher
value; ↓, decrease/lower value); Valence Dimension: +/Appr,
positive/approach; −/Avoid, negative/avoidance; Arousal: Mod., moderate;
Pos, positive/rewarding outcome/stimulus; Neg, negative/punishing
outcome/stimulus; $, monetary reward; -$, monetary penalty; α, mixing
factor; P(C,T |X0,Y0)/β, probability of trial being congruent at trial onset
t = 0 (e.g., in Stroop or Flanker task); x(t) = sensory input for central
stimulus, y (t) = sensory input for flanker stimulus; P(pos), probability of
positive stimulus/outcome (e.g., happy face), P(Neg), probability of
negative stimulus/outcome (e.g., angry face, painful stimulus); P(go) =
P(d = 1) = probability of upcoming trial being Go trial; P(NoGo) = P(d = 0)
= probability of upcoming trial being Nogo trial, P(stop) = probability of
upcoming trial (k) being Stop trial (r0 = initialization prior value at first trial;
rk − 1, initialization prior value from previous trial); α, mixing coefficient;
P(τ < D|d = 0), probability of making “false alarm error” (incorrect go
responses), P(τ = D|d = 1) = probability of making “miss” error (incorrect
nogo response); C(time) = c, cost of time, C(effort), cost of effort
associated with action; C(error) = ce, cost of error; τ, trial termination
time; D, trial deadline; d, true stimulus state (e.g., here d = 0 for NoGo
trials, d = 1 for Go trials).
about upcoming events. For instance, a central assumption of
the Bayesian ideal observer model is an iterative estimation of
the likelihood of certain events as sensory disambiguation pro-
ceeds until certain probability thresholds that minimize the cost
function are reached (at which point an action is selected). These
probability distributions may also be updated over the course of
multiple trial/response dyads (generating posterior distributions)
based on the history of prior estimates and current trial out-
come (Bayes rule; e.g., Equation 3b). Thus, prior distributions are
often modeled as the combination of a fixed initial prior (repre-
senting pre-task frequency estimates) and the previous posterior
distributions capturing the history of multiple trials in the task
(Shenoy and Yu, 2011); see Equation 3a). While factors such as
previous experience with the inhibitory task are likely to heavily
influence these prior values, we propose that emotional attributes
could be similarly used as heuristics to gauge how likely an event
or upcoming action is, resulting in a general shift in values (i.e.,
mean change) or changes in the distribution shape (e.g., variance,
skew; see Figure 4 top panel “Prior Distributions”). Supporting
the plausibility of this hypothesis, there is robust evidence of
similar biases in subjective probability estimation in healthy pop-
ulations, typically reflecting underestimation of high probabilities
and overestimation of low probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003).
Based on the reviewed literature and extensive evidence of
interdependence between valence laden information and action
tendencies (e.g., activation vs. inhibition; see (Huys et al.,
2011; Dayan, 2012), we consider two mediating mechanisms by
which valence and arousal could bias probabilistic computations,
including outcome expectancies (see Figure 4 top panel, blue
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area), and action expectancies (see Figure 4 top panel, green
area). Finally, given evidence of distinct functional and neuro-
chemical systems involved in approach related actions (e.g., “go”),
action cancellation (e.g., stopping an initiated action, “stop”),
and inhibition (e.g., withholding an action, “no-go” (Frank, 2005;
Eagle et al., 2008; Swick et al., 2011), our proposed model distin-
guishes these three types of action requirements when consider-
ing potential emotional influences. We note that approach-based
activation in the context of standard inhibitory paradigms is most
commonly associated with go actions, which could be in the con-
text of gaining a reward or avoiding “miss” errors. The latter
is more akin to a form of active avoidance (i.e., performing an
action to avoid a negative outcome). In contrast, inhibition or
action restraint in the present framework (e.g., “nogo” responses)
is related to passive avoidance (e.g., not performing an action to
avoid “false alarm” errors or other penalties). This is consistent
with actor-critic models of reinforcement learning (Maia, 2010;
Dayan, 2012) and neural evidence that learning of both approach
actions and avoidant actions involve phasic firing of dopamine
neurons (predominantly via D1 receptors) in the dorsal striatum
(Montague et al., 2004; Samson et al., 2010). In contrast, dips
in dopamine (via D2 receptors in the “no-go” indirect pathway)
and serotonin may be primarily involved in mediating inhibition
or action constraint (Frank et al., 2004; Dayan and Huys, 2008;
Kravitz et al., 2012).
Valence/motivational tendency
Action expectancies. The valence of an emotional state provides
information about one’s disposition toward stimuli or actions in
the environment (Schwarz and Clore, 1983), with positive valence
promoting approach and negative valence promoting avoidance.
Suchmotivational information may in turn be integrated into the
interoceptive processes taking place during concurrent inhibitory
control behavior. Thus, we suggest that emotion may exert influ-
ence on behavior by modulating expectations of encountering
specific action requirements (i.e., trial types) relevant to the
inhibitory control task. For example, in a go/no-go paradigm, one
has to choose between two types of behavioral responses, namely
a “go”/approach action or a “no-go”/inhibition response. We
hypothesize that positive valence may promote approach actions
by increasing expectancies of having to implement an approach
action (e.g., expectation to encounter a “go” trial) or decreas-
ing expectancies of implementing action restraint (e.g., “no-go”
trial), while negative valence may have the opposite effect. In
probabilistic terms, the positive interoceptive information con-
ferred by an emotional state may increase an initial and fixed
prior’s values (e.g., an overall mean shift of the distribution) for
go trials [i.e., P(d = 1) = P(Go)], as they involve an approach
action, and/or decrease such prior values for no-go inhibitory
trials [i.e., P(d = 0) = P(NoGo) = 1-P(Go)]. Either of these
biases would promote faster go decisions (and higher rates of false
alarm errors) as shorter go reaction times (τ) would minimize
the cost function (see Equation 5b). This is because such higher
prior over the frequency of go stimuli would provide a higher
starting point for the evidence accumulation process, thus requir-
ing a shorter time for the belief state (bt) to reach the decision
boundary and generate a go response; see (Shenoy and Yu, 2012).
Alternatively, a negative emotional state should have the opposite
effect in biasing upward no-go prior values (and/or decreasing go
prior values), resulting in longer go reaction times (andmoremiss
errors).
An extensive behavioral and neural literature suggests hedonic
valence and action tendencies have strong interdependence, sup-
porting our hypotheses. For instance an appetitive state (e.g., con-
ditioned appetitive cue) promotes approach actions and hinders
withdrawal and action constraint/no-go responses, while aver-
sive cues have the reverse effect (Huys et al., 2011; Guitart-Masip
et al., 2011b). Individuals are also more likely to learn go actions
in rewarded conditions and less likely to learn passive avoidance
(i.e., no-go choices) in punished conditions (Guitart-Masip et al.,
2011b, 2012). Similarly, higher commission rates are observed
when appetitive stimuli are paired with a no-go (i.e., action
restraint) requirement (Hare et al., 2005; Schulz et al., 2007;
Albert et al., 2011). Here, the positive valence/approach moti-
vation may increase expectations of encountering a go trial [i.e.,
higher P(Go)], again promoting earlier responses (i.e., shorter τ;
see Equation 5b). Importantly, valence congruent effects are also
observed with the valence of an action (i.e., approach vs. with-
drawal). For instance, Huys et al. (2011) showed that even after
controlling for behavioral activation/inhibition and the valence of
contingent rewards/punishments, an active withdrawal response
was facilitated by aversive states but inhibited by an appetitive
state. Similarly individuals scoring higher on trait measures of
reward expectations demonstrate slower SSRTs, while those with
higher punishment expectations produce faster SSRTs in stop-
signal tasks (Avila and Parcet, 2001). Thus, while appetitive states
may increase go trials expectancies, they may decrease expectan-
cies of encountering action cancellation trials [i.e., P(stop)=
<p(rk|sk− 1)> in Equation 3a] while the reverse is true for
aversive states.
Outcome expectancies. Consistent with connectionist (or neu-
ral network) accounts (Mathews and Macleod, 1994), emotional
states have been shown to activate mood-congruent information
and concepts in memory, which in turn increases the likeli-
hood this information is attended to (Forgas et al., 1984; Eich
et al., 1994; Bower et al., 2001). We suggest that these mood-
congruent effects, by modulating the “landscape” of informa-
tion in awareness, produce biased expectations of encountering
valence-congruent outcomes. Again, these biases could manifest
by increases or decreases in the central tendency and/or shape of
the prior probability distributions associated with valence laden
events. For instance, negative affect, such as sadness and anxiety,
promotes higher expectations of punishment and aversive events
(Abramson et al., 1989; Ahrens and Haaga, 1993; Handley et al.,
2004), while euphoria is associated with higher expectations or
reward and success (Johnson, 2005; Abler et al., 2007). In addi-
tion, relative to euthymic controls, sad or depressed individuals
are more accurate and faster at recognizing sad affect in human
faces (Lennox et al., 2004), while socially anxious individuals are
better at identifying angry faces (Joormann and Gotlib, 2006).
In contrast, manic individuals are less accurate at identifying sad
faces (Lennox et al., 2004). These biases have been linked to differ-
ent neural patterns in face recognition areas, suggesting a different
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prior “expertise,” rather than differences in emotional response.
In the context of action requirements tied to emotional cues (e.g.,
in affective go no-go paradigms), such biases would result in a
reduced discrepancy between internal predictions of encounter-
ing a mood congruent stimulus [e.g., positive or negative facial
expression, i.e., P(Pos)/P(Neg) Figure 4] and the actual occur-
rence of this event. This should in turn facilitate (i.e., speed up)
the identification of mood-congruent stimuli in emotional rela-
tive to euthymic individuals. Consistent with this hypothesis, in
affective go no-go paradigms, manic patients respond faster to
happy stimuli and slower to negative stimuli on go trials, and
depressed patients respond faster to sad stimuli (Murphy et al.,
1999; Erickson et al., 2005; Ladouceur et al., 2006). These types
of emotional biases could impact inhibitory function more indi-
rectly than those associated with action requirement expectancies,
possibly by facilitating or slowing the disambiguation of emo-
tional cues tied to action requirements. This may be particularly
relevant for inhibitory control within social interactive contexts.
Arousal
Action expectancies. Increased arousal has been associated with
impaired functioning of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), includ-
ing regions necessary to implement inhibitory control such
as the inferior frontal gyrus (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009). In
addition, high arousal promotes stronger reliance on habit-
ual/prepotent responses and generally decreases goal-directed
responding (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Schwabe and Wolf, 2009).
Therefore, we suggest that high arousal is more likely to impair
inhibitory control by reducing the attentional and computational
resources necessary to disambiguate task relevant information
(see Figure 4; red area). This is consistent with studies link-
ing arousal prompted by conditioned cues to electric shock to
a selective slowing during inhibitory trials in Stroop and Stop-
signal tasks (Pallak et al., 1975; Pessoa et al., 2012). Indeed,
because incongruent, non-prepotent, responses involvemore sen-
sory disambiguation and/or more effort to shift response set,
such computational processes may more heavily rely on intact
PFC function and executive resources. Therefore, the taxing of
PFC function under high arousal would be expected to more
selectively impact performance during incongruent trials. Other
work, however, points to a more general arousal-driven impair-
ment for both prepotent and inhibitory responses, notably in
Stroop (Blair et al., 2007), stop-signal (Verbruggen and De
Houwer, 2007), and go/no-go (De Houwer and Tibboel, 2010)
paradigms.
In contrast, evidence suggests that moderate levels of arousal
can facilitate executive and PFC function, consistent with an
inverted U shape relationship between arousal and cognitive per-
formance (Easterbrook, 1959; Eysenck, 1982; Arnsten, 1998).
Moderate levels of norepinephrine (NE) release strengthen pre-
frontal cortical functions via actions at post-synaptic α-2A
adrenoceptors with high affinity for NE, which has been associ-
ated with improved set shifting function and selective attention
(Ramos and Arnsten, 2007). Based on this literature, we pro-
pose that moderate arousal may facilitate activation, particularly
action cancellation (e.g., stop response), by increasing expectancy
of encountering stop trials. This is consistent with extensive
animal literature highlighting the role of NE as a neural “inter-
rupt” (Sara and Segal, 1991; Dayan and Yu, 2006) and recent
studies showing that both NE and dopamine play an important
role in regulating impulsivity and speed of behavioral control in
ADHD (Arnsten et al., 1984; Frank et al., 2006; Arnsten, 2009b).
Consistent with this hypothesis, both human and animal studies
point to a selective facilitating effect of norepinephrine in stop-
signal paradigms, improving SSRTs while go reaction times are
typically unchanged (Overtoom et al., 2003; Chamberlain et al.,
2006; Robinson et al., 2007). Moderate arousal induced by both
positive and aversive images were also found to improve SSRTs
in humans (Pessoa et al., 2012). This contrasts with pharmaco-
logical studies that suggest no effect of dopamine or serotonin
on SSRTs, but rather preferential effects on go/approach actions
and action constraint/inhibition respectively (Eagle et al., 2008).
Computationally, moderate arousal may increase the mean of
the prior distribution associated with the frequency estimate of
stop trials p0(rk), which in turn would result in a similar upward
shift in the predictive probability of stop trials P(stop) [i.e., the
mean of the predictive distribution p(rk|sk− 1), see Equations
3a and b].
In relation to action cancellation, arousal should similarly
bias expectancies related to cancelling automated responses in
interference paradigms (e.g., interruption of prepotent responses
during incongruent trials in Stroop or Flanker tasks). Specifically,
moderate arousal may increase expectations of encountering
incongruent events (requiring action cancellation) or decrease
expectations of encountering congruent trials, which would result
in less impairment in incongruent/inhibitory trials. For instance,
in flanker paradigms (and presumably in other interference
tasks), modeling the sensory disambiguation process with a joint
probability of true stimulus and trial type [i.e., P(C,T|Xt, Yt), see
Equation 1] produces inferential performance that successfully
captures behavioral data. Importantly, increasing its initialization
prior to reflect a bias toward compatibility [P(C,T|X0, Y0), β >
0.5/chance] produces a shift in inference that would be expected
to lead to worse performance on incompatible trials (Yu et al.,
2009). This relates to a longer latency for the probability of the
trial being incongruent to rise up toward 1 on incongruent tri-
als (as it starts from a lower anchor value). Thus, while such
compatibility bias is observed in normative samples (Yu et al.,
2009), we hypothesize that moderate arousal could reduce this
bias, which would be reflected by a lower value of the β parameter
in the model (i.e., closer to 0.5). This is consistent with improved
Stroop performance in moderate arousal condition (mild shock
expectation; Pallak et al., 1975).
Outcome expectancies. While we are not aware of any studies
isolating the effect of arousal from valence on outcome expecta-
tions, some work suggests that prolonged physiological arousal
in anxiety and trauma conditions may play a role in maintain-
ing expectations of danger (Norton and Asmundson, 2004). It
remains difficult, however, to disentangle the role of arousal from
valence in these effects, whichmay be better explained by valence-
congruent effects on memory and attention (see above). Thus, we
suggest that the arousal dimension is unlikely to impact outcome
expectancies (e.g., reward vs. punishment), but rather modulates
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action preparedness and expectations of encountering action can-
cellation trials (via NE release as previously noted). Indeed, based
on the affective go/no-go studies, valence-congruent response
biases in go reaction times were observed in depressed and manic
patients (Murphy et al., 1999; Ladouceur et al., 2006) as opposed
to a unidirectional effect of emotion (which would be more
consistent with an arousal effect). This speaks against a poten-
tial role of moderate arousal in biasing probabilistic outcome
expectancies. In addition, higher levels of arousal are likely to
have a deleterious impact on computational recourses mediated
by impaired PFC function (Ramos and Arnsten, 2007).
Neural implementation
Valence-dependent biases on approach activation and inhibition
tendencies are likely to preferentially involve the dopamine and
serotonin signaling in the dorsal striatum. The approach “go”
pathway is facilitated by positive/rewarding states via dopamine
(D1 receptors) while serotonin and dopamine (D2 receptors) are
preferentially involved in linking negative/aversive valence to the
inhibition/”nogo pathway (Frank et al., 2004; Montague et al.,
2004; Dayan and Huys, 2008). Active withdrawal and action can-
celation may also involve serotonin (Deakin and Graeff, 1991).
In addition, norepinephrine and dopamine are likely to play a
key role in mediating arousal effects on action cancelation by
facilitating fronto-striatal communication (Ramos and Arnsten,
2007; Eagle et al., 2008). In terms of brain regions, probability
computation (in contrast to valuation) within an expected util-
ity framework has been associated with activation of the mesial
PFC (Knutson and Peterson, 2005), although recent evidence
points to subcortical correlates in anterior and lateral foci of
the ventral striatum (Yacubian et al., 2007). While this is still
an emerging program of research, recent work also suggests
that the dorsomedial PFC encodes in a dose-response manner a
representation of the history of successive incongruent trials in
interference paradigms (Horga et al., 2011). Such neural repre-
sentations appear critical to maintaining cognitive control in the
task, as they influenced the neural and behavioral adaptation to
incongruency in this task supported by a network involving the
pre supplementary motor areas (SMA) and dorsal anterior cingu-
late (dACC). Based on this research, computational biases related
to the cumulative magnitude of certain event probabilities (e.g.,
expectancy of action cancellation requirement), including those
driven by emotion, may be reflected by differential recruitment
of the dorsomedial PFC. In addition, converging evidence sug-
gests that the dACC is involved in tracking conflict (Botvinick
et al., 1999, 2001) and more generally expectancy violation
(Somerville et al., 2006; Kross et al., 2007; Chang and Sanfey,
2011). In line with a conflict monitoring hypothesis, activation of
this region is indeed consistently observed during incongruent/
high conflict trials in various inhibitory control tasks (Botvinick
et al., 2001) and predicts subsequent prefrontal recruitment
and behavioral adjustments (Kerns et al., 2004; Kerns, 2006).
Importantly, recent computational work highlights the selective
involvement of the dACC in coding the discrepancy between
internally computed probabilities of response inhibition and
actual outcome, a form of “Bayesian prediction error” (Ide et al.,
2013), making this region a plausible candidate for tracking the
magnitude of potential emotion-driven biases in Bayesian error
prediction.
VALUATION
We now consider emotion-driven biases associated with valua-
tion processes and argue that emotional attributes may increase
or decrease the relative costs of task-related actions and out-
comes. Based on extensive empirical and computational evidence
from the reinforcement learning literature, a representation of
the values (or expected reward) associated with possible actions
is necessary to support the selection of actions in goal-directed
behavior (Montague et al., 2006). Mesolimbic dopamine has been
posited to play a crucial role in the “binding” of such hedonic
values and reward-related actions or stimuli, providing a moti-
vational weight or “incentive salience” to these actions/stimuli
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Berridge, 2007). Thus, as with any
type of goal-directed behavior, the selection of actions involved
in inhibitory control tasks (e.g., go vs. no-go actions) should
be modulated by such a valuation system. Consistent with this
hypothesis, manipulating the perceived value of response speed
vs. accuracy (e.g., with subtle changes in instructions) pro-
duces behavioral changes in concert with the expected motiva-
tional shifts in stop-signal paradigms (Band et al., 2003; Liddle
et al., 2009). Overall this suggests that the relative values asso-
ciated with task-related actions/events contribute to modulating
inhibitory behavior independently of probabilistic computations
(e.g., action requirement expectancies). Because emotion again
conveys information about one’s state and disposition (Schwarz
and Clore, 1983), an intuitive prediction is that the valence of an
emotional state is likely to modulate the incentive salience (i.e.,
value) of particular task-related actions/outcomes. In Bayesian
terms, the relative weight or salience of these actions/events is
reflected in the cost function, and most commonly in terms of
speed vs. accuracy tradeoffs (see Equations 4a, 5a). As with the
probabilistic computation section, we consider valuation biases
separately for task-related actions (e.g., go vs. no-go; Figure 4,
bottom panel, green area) and outcomes (e.g., accuracy; Figure 4,
bottom panel, blue area). Based on limited evidence for distinct
valuation mechanisms for different types of action requirements,
and given previous work linking reward with the degree of
effort/vigor of a particular action (Niv et al., 2007), we sim-
plify the action category to basic (approach-based) activation and
inhibition.
Valence/motivational tendency
Action valuation. Some animal studies suggest that phasic release
of dopamine in the NAcc is involved in coding the predictive
reward of an action and is directly related to the degree an
animal overcomes and maintains effort to obtain this reward
(Morris et al., 2006; Phillips et al., 2007; Salamone et al., 2007).
This research points to a potential role of NAcc dopamine in
representing effort-related costs (i.e., associated with behavioral
activation). In a closely related line of work, recent computational
accounts suggest that tonic levels of dopamine release encode the
average rate of available reward per unit of time, which is inversely
proportional to opportunity costs associated with slower responses
(Niv et al., 2007; Shadmehr, 2010; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011a). In
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contrast to those associated with effort (i.e., activation), opportu-
nity costs can be conceptualized as cost of time or “waiting to act”
(i.e., inhibition).
Based on this research, we conjecture that the degree to which
an emotion is appetitive may modulate the value of engaging in
action (e.g., reducing the cost of effort associated with behavioral
responses). For instance, in affective go/no-go paradigms, a pos-
itive emotional state (or the anticipation of such state) should
reduce the cost of effort associated with go actions [or increase
opportunity costs associated with inhibition; i.e., C(time) = c
in Equations 4a–c, 5a–b and Figure 4]. Computationally, either
biases should result in selecting go actions at earlier stages of
the sensory disambiguation process (i.e., faster reaction times
wouldminimize cost). Similarly, the aversive tone of an emotional
state may have the opposite effect, i.e., increasing activation/effort
costs, thus promoting inaction. Consistent with these predictions,
appetitive Pavlovian stimuli specifically promote “go” actions and
inhibit no-action and withdrawal, while aversive cues promote
the opposite pattern (Hare et al., 2005; Huys et al., 2011; Guitart-
Masip et al., 2012). Importantly, activations in the striatum
(ventral putamen) and ventral tegmental area (VTA) have been
found to correlate with the magnitude of go and no-go action val-
ues with opposite signs for each respective action (Guitart-Masip
et al., 2012).
Outcome valuation. Appetitive vs. aversive emotional states can
have valence-congruent modulating effects on hedonic experi-
ence. For instance a depressed or sad mood reduces the pleasant-
ness of rewards and amplifies perception of pain, while positive
mood lowers pain ratings and increases pain tolerance (Tang
et al., 2008; Zhao and Chen, 2009; Berna et al., 2010). This is
consistent with extensive evidence that negative mood states are
associated with reduced sensitivity to reward (Henriques and
Davidson, 2000; Harlé and Sanfey, 2007; Foti and Hajcak, 2010;
Disner et al., 2011), as well as increased sensitivity to error (an
aversive event) demonstrated by stronger amplitudes of the error
related negativity (ERN) (Paulus et al., 2004; Pizzagalli et al., 2005;
Olvet and Hajcak, 2008; Wiswede et al., 2009; Weinberg et al.,
2010) and more post error slowing (Luu et al., 2000; Boksem
et al., 2008; Compton et al., 2008). In contrast, appetitive states
have been linked to increased reward sensitivity (Johnson, 2005),
increased perception of happiness (Trevisani et al., 2008) and
reduced post error slowing in interference tasks, consistent with
a reduced monitoring of error (van Steenbergen et al., 2009,
2010).
Accordingly, we suggest that, in addition to modulating action
valuation, the valence of an emotional state may bias the relative
value/cost of task-related outcomes (e.g., rewards and punish-
ments associated with performance). Specifically, positive emo-
tion should enhance the relative value, i.e., decrease the relative
cost of rewarding outcomes [e.g., C($) Figure 4]. In contrast,
negative emotional states would be more likely to prompt an
overestimation of the cost of error or other aversive events [i.e.,
C(-$), C(error)/ce, see Equations 4a–c, 5a–b and Figure 4)].
For instance, to minimize average costs in a go/no-go task (see
Equations 5b), this over-weighing of false alarm costs (i.e., higher
value of ce) would be associated with a lower threshold for the
rate of false alarm occurrence across trials [i.e., P(false alarm)
= P(τ < D|d = 0) P(d = 0) = P(τ < D|d = 0) P (NoGo); see
Equation 5a,b). This would in turn prompt longer response times
needed for sensory disambiguation to unfold and for P(NoGo)
to reach a lower threshold. This is because the cost associated
with go actions [Qg(bt)] would be overall higher, requiring more
time to drop lower than the cost of waiting [Qw(bt)]. Although
we are not aware of any study specifically testing this relation-
ship, depressed individuals were slower on go trials and made less
commission errors in a parametric go no-go paradigm, sugges-
tive of heightened concern for errors (Langenecker et al., 2007).
Similarly, in individuals with generalized anxiety disorder, bet-
ter performance on a classic color-word Stroop has been linked
to higher levels of worry and trait anxiety (Price and Mohlman,
2007).
Arousal
Action valuation. The clinical and social psychology literature
suggest that physiologically induced arousal can be misattributed
in evaluative processes such as interpersonal preferences and
risk assessment (Schachter and Singer, 1962; Sinclair et al.,
1994). This is reflected by more extreme intensity ratings of
either positive or negative stimuli, suggesting a unidirectional
(i.e., enhancing) role of arousal in modulating hedonic rat-
ings of concurrent events. For instance, perceived arousal in
the context of positive stimuli leads to higher positive valence
ratings, while increased arousal in a negative context leads to
higher aversive ratings (Storbeck and Clore, 2008). Thus, rather
than arousal independently modulating valuation processes, it
is the interaction of arousal and valence which seems to pro-
duce valuation biases. This fits with the neural and physiolog-
ical literature highlighting the role of arousal in modulating
attention to particular stimuli and action preparedness (Schutter
et al., 2008; Gur et al., 2009), hence our proposal it may con-
tribute to probabilistic expectancy biases (see section Probabilistic
Computation). Based on this literature, we suggest this gener-
ally speaks against an independent effect of arousal on valuation
processes.
Outcome valuation. As mentioned above, arousal may play a
“magnifying” role in valuation processes by interacting with
appetitive or aversive valence. This could argue for arousal pro-
moting unidirectional increase in the relative weights of valence-
laden computational elements in the cost function. That is, the
value of both positive and negative task-related outcomes, such
as performance dependent rewards [i.e., C($)] and penalties [i.e.,
C(-$) see Figure 4] would be increased. Arousal in the context of
punishment sensitivity in anxiety may further increase the rela-
tive weight of error in the cost function (e.g., ce in Equations 5a,b),
which would in turn lead to slower responses (to minimize overall
costs) and possibly decreased error rates. This is consistent with
the positive relationship observed between worry/anxious preoc-
cupation and reaction times in anxious individuals (Price and
Mohlman, 2007). However, in this study, reaction times were not
correlated with anxious arousal per se, which makes these results
more consistent with valence dependent biases (see above). In
addition, while higher levels of arousal have been associated with
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a general slowing in euthymic individuals independently of posi-
tive vs. negative emotional context (Blair et al., 2007; Verbruggen
and De Houwer, 2007; Pessoa et al., 2012), this pattern may
again be more parsimoniously explained by an impairment of
PFC function and related depletion of attentional and executive
resources (Arnsten, 2009a).
Neural implementation
At the neural level, the ventral striatum (specifically the nucleus
accumbens) has been consistently associated with reward sensitiv-
ity and reward based learning; (Knutson et al., 2001; O’Doherty,
2004; Winkielman et al., 2007). An important body of research
has shown that phasic release of dopamine in the NAcc is involved
in learning the predictive value of conditioned stimuli (Schultz
et al., 1997; Flagel et al., 2010), which is thus likely to play a role
in the coding of task related outcomes and stimuli (e.g., response
cues, error or reward contingent on performance). Other research
further suggests that tonic dopamine levels in this region is
involved in coding opportunity costs associated with waiting to
act (Niv et al., 2007; Shadmehr, 2010), while phasic dopamine
release may be involved in the representation of effort associ-
ated with goal directed behavior (Phillips et al., 2007; Salamone
et al., 2007). This is consistent with findings of caudate activa-
tion during inhibition (no-go responses) in positive/appetitive
context, which was proportional to commission error rates (Hare
et al., 2005). Finally recent computational work has identified
areas in the ventral striatum and VTA as specifically encoding
instrumentally learnt values of go and no/go actions (Guitart-
Masip et al., 2012). These regions are therefore plausible neural
markers for tracking action valuation biases. In addition, activa-
tion of the anterior insula has been associated with sensitivity
to monetary losses (a punishing outcome) and learning from
aversive outcomes (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Paulus et al.,
2005; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2008) including in the context of a
negative mood state (Harlé et al., 2012). Thus, valuation biases
related to aversive states and punishment expectancy may involve
this region. Finally, given its implication in reward valuation
(O’Doherty, 2004; Montague et al., 2006) and in integrating
motivational attributes of various stimuli into decision-making
[somatic markers; see (Damasio, 1994)], the OFC is likely to
be involved in the integration of emotional context in valuation
biases.
SUMMARY
We described a simple, unifying framework for inhibitory con-
trol that serves as a comprehensive scaffold to integrate emotional
influences on cognitive processes. In our view, emotion can
be understood as additional context (e.g., interoceptive expe-
rience), which constrains and biases the computations in an
“ideal observer model” of inhibitory control. That is, the role
of affect in inhibitory control can be interpreted in terms
of well-understood computational aspects of cognition such
as beliefs, action valuation and choice. Thus, emotion may
affect inhibitory behavior by biasing (a) prior expectations
and associated changes in internal beliefs about various task-
relevant events, and (b) action/outcome valuation (see Figure 4).
Importantly, on the basis of behavioral and neural data, the
framework highlights a strong interdependence between the
appetitive/aversive nature of emotional states and basic action
tendencies that are intrinsic to inhibitory control. Thus, we sur-
mise that the valence dimension may have primary influences
on action parameters associated with approach and inhibition
(action constraint), and exert valence congruent influences on
outcome valuation and expectancies. In contrast, arousal may
have a more selective role in biasing expectancies of action can-
cellation. In addition, we argue that higher levels of arousal
may more indirectly modulate the computational processes
supporting inhibitory function by redirecting attention away
from task-relevant information and generally impairing pre-
frontal function and related computational mechanisms. Our
theoretical framework has some limitations inherent to the
challenge of testing these hypotheses. For instance, the sep-
arate effect of valence and arousal are difficult to disentan-
gle in both experimental settings and affective disorders. The
breadth of individual variability in the experience and regula-
tion of emotion make these potential effects further difficult to
pinpoint.
With regard to the potential impact of emotion on sensory dis-
ambiguation, we have emphasized the contribution of outcome
and action expectancies (i.e., prior distributions associated with
valence congruent events and trial type). However, we should
note that more downstream effects of emotion have been doc-
umented. For instance, valence and arousal have been shown to
modulate visual processing style (i.e., global vs. detail) and selec-
tive attention (e.g., breadth of attentional focus; (Loftus et al.,
1987; Basso et al., 1996; Gasper and Clore, 2002). Although out-
side the scope of this review, modeling potential biases in sensory
input parameters (e.g., sensory input mixing factors) may cap-
ture additional aspects of the interaction between emotion and
inhibitory control.
Finally, an equally important aspect of such emotion-
cognition interactions is the iterative nature of any emotion-
cognitions interactions. That is behavioral performance and the
dynamic feedback received when engaged in inhibitory control
tasks are likely to modulate emotional state. As a consequence,
the nature and types of biases impacting inhibitory control are
likely to emerge from the dynamic interaction between Bayesian
computation of response costs, selection of actions, and reception
of outcomes, which subsequently affect the Bayesian updating of
beliefs. These dynamic processes might be particularly relevant in
psychopathological conditions, which emerge over longer periods
of time.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A Bayesian computational framework provides a fine-grained
quantification of emotion and cognitive control interactions by
dividing the observed behavior into several contributing neuro-
cognitive subprocesses. This in turn provides a powerful tool to
test independent affect infusion hypotheses, which are better able
to delineate the complex nature of emotion and psychopathology,
and may help refine neurocognitive models of various clini-
cal conditions. For instance, behavioral performance could be
used to infer specific quantitative biases in one’s cost or reward
functions or in one’s ability to estimate probability. This approach
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could shed light on the heterogeneous nature of conditions such
as depression or substance dependence, bymapping different sub-
type profiles to specific computational processes and associated
neural markers (e.g., anhedonia, uncertainty avoidance, impul-
siveness). Ultimately, this may help refine our understanding of
how specific behavioral and pharmacological treatments might
address these various biases and thus refine our tailoring and
effectiveness of psychiatric treatment.
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